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TITLE TO INCOME TAX REFUNDS UPON
ADJUDICATION IN BANKRUPTCY
Until recently it was firmly established that an income tax
refund payable to a bankrupt after his adjudication as such is
"property" which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy under section
70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act (the Act).' One of the primary pur-
poses of the Act is to give to the creditors everything of value
possessed by the bankrupt, without at the same time driving him
into a position from which he will be unable to reestablish himself
and become solvent. 2 The tax refund was considered an asset which
could pass to the trustee without presenting any such insurmount-
able obstacle to the bankrupt.
Despite the consistency of earlier cases within its jurisdiction as
well as without, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit chose to deviate from this firm ground in In re Cedor, 3
decided late in 1972. However, five months later, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in In re Kokoszka, 4 ex-
plicitly refused to follow Cedor5 and returned to settled judicial
precedent.
The court in Cedor had consolidated the cases of two bank-
rupts, Cedor and James. In both of these cases, the trustee asserted
his claim to an income tax refund which resulted from an excess of
taxes withheld over the amount of taxes actually due. Cedor had
had withheld the minimum required by the Internal Revenue Code; 6
James, however, did not initially claim all the exemptions to which
he was entitled, thereby increasing the amount of his refund. 7
U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970). The pertinent portion of § 70a(5) is quoted in the text at
note 46 infra.
Several cases have dealt with the specific nature of the income tax refund and have held
it is property which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy: In re Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620 (D,
Minn. 1071), leave to appeal denied (8th Cir. May 14, 1971) (unreported), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1040 (1972); In re Bistrick, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. ¶ 63,148, at
72,769 (E.D. Wis. 1969); In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S,D,'Cal. 1962). The holding was
implicit in other cases: In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th Cir,), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972); Danning v. Mintz, 367 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 386 U.S. 990 (1967);
Hoffman v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). The income tax refund was held
to have passed to the trustee in bankruptcy in In re Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498 (C.D. Cal.),
rev'd and remanded per curiam, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1973) (No. 73-289), although it was subsequently reversed on
appeal on the basis of In re Cedor, 470 F. 2d 996 (9th Cir.), affg per curiam 337 F. Supp. 1103
(N.D. Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973), one of the principal cases of this
comment.
2 See, e.g., Stellwagen v. Chn, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v, United States Fid.
& Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
3 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.), affg per curiam 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D, Cal. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973).
4 479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir, 1973),'cert, granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973) (No.
73-5265).
5
 479 F.2d at 995, 996.
6 Int, Rev, Code of 1954, §§ 3201, 3202(a).
7 The statement of facts is taken from 337 F. Supp. at 1104-05.
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In each case the bankrupt had moved to recover at least a
portion of his refund,' and'the referee had denied the motion.' The
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
vacated the orders of the referee denying the motions and HELD:
(1) Insofar as an income tax refund is attributable to
involuntary payment—withholding of the minimum
amount required by law—that portion of such refund is
not "property" within the meaning of section 70a(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act, and therefore does not pass to the
trustee; 1 °
(2) Insofar as an income tax refund is attributable to
voluntary payment—withholding in excess of the minimum
required amount—that portion of such refund is "prop-
erty" within section 70a(5), and does, therefore, pass to the
trustee; 11
(3) Insofar as an income tax refund is treated as "prop-
erty" passing to the trustee, the Restriction on Garnish-
ment provision of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(CCPA) 12 applies, thereby limiting the amount which may
pass to the trustees to no more than twenty-five percent of
the amount deemed "property." 13
The court therefore remanded the case to the referee for the appro-
priate determinations. 14 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed per
curiam on the basis of the district court opinion."
The Second Circuit was faced with the identical issue in
Kokoszka. The United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut had consolidated the cases of bankrupts Kokoszka, Sands
and O'Brien, each of whom was appealing the referee's denial of a
motion to vacate an order to turn over his tax refund to the trustee
in bankruptcy. 16 In each case, the bankrupt had claimed on his tax
g The bankrupt James claimed the total amount of the income tax refund; Cedor
originally claimed only seventy-five percent of the refund, conceding that twenty-five percent
was an asset of the estate. In his brief on appeal, however, Cedor claimed the full amount of
the refund for the first time. Id. at 1104.
9 Id.
ig Id. at 1105,
LI Id. at 1106.
11 . 15 U.S.C. * 1673 (1970).
337 F. Supp. at 1107.
34
 Id, at 1108.
15 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972).
is 479 F.2d at 993.
Henry Kokoszka was employed for approximately three months in 1971; his tax refund of
$250.90 was presumably due to the fact that the periodic withholdings were based on a total
annual compensation which was more than what was actually earned. Certificate of Referee
on Petition for Review at 2-3, in Appendix of Appellants at 11A-12A, In re Kokoszka, 479
F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973). Upon the order of the referee, he turned over the refund amount
pending this appeal, and was discharged. 479 F.2d at 993.
Herbert E. Sands received a refund which had been reduced from $535.04 to $201.97
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withholding statement the maximum number of deductions to which
he was entitled.' 7
 The Second Circuit, affirming the unreported
decision of the district court," HELD: an income tax refund pay-
able to the bankrupt after filing a bankruptcy petition is "property"
within the meaning of section 70a(5) and therefore passes to the
trustee," furthermore, the Restriction on Garnishment provision of
the CCPA is not applicable to such property. 2° Although the ques-
tion of voluntary withholding was not directly before the court in
Kokoszka, it can be inferred that the holding was meant to apply to
all tax refunds, whether attributable to voluntary or involuntary
withholding, since even involuntary payments were held to pass to
the trustee.
The decision in Cedor has sparked some criticism2 ' as a
broadening of the exceptions to section 70a(5). This comment will
explore the reasoning which has led to the irreconcilable holdings in
Cedor and Kokoszka. First, the remedy of bankruptcies, the pur-
poses behind the Bankruptcy Act, and prior case law will be re-
viewed. Next, the reasoning of the two principal cases will be
analyzed. Finally, recommendations for legislative and judicial con-
sideration will be offered.
BANKRUPTCY AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
The Constitution authorizes Congress to establish "uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."22
 The relief thus provided by the bankruptcy system is a
benefit created by Congress, not a right protected by the United
States Constitution. 23
 Congress used this power only sparingly dur-
because of the government's claim for unpaid back taxes. The bankrupt disobeyed a turn-over
order and spent the refund on furniture for his family. The referee therefore denied him a
discharge in bankruptcy. Order on Trustee's Petition to Deny Discharge in Bankruptcy at 2,
in Appendix of Appellants at 34A, In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973).
Frank O'Brien received a refund of $136.00, which he was ordered to turn over to the
trustee. He refused to obey this order, whereupon the trustee moved to deny him a discharge.
As of the date of the Kokoszka opinion, the referee had not yet ruled on this motion. 479 F.2d
at 993.
In a related case, O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972), bankrupts
O'Brien and Sands contested the referee's refusal to certify the petitions for review of the
denials of discharge because they could not pay the $10 filing fee. The district court held that
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970) applies to petitions for review, thus allowing for the waiver of the
filing fee in the case of indigents. 336 F. Supp. at 1032. To impose the filing fee upon them
would be to deprive them of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. Id. at 1033.
17
 479 F.2d at 993.
18
 Id, at 998.
19 Id. at 995.
20
 Id. at 996.
7 ' See id. at 995, 996; Lee, Title to Property—Employee Bankrupts' Income Tax Re-
funds, 47 Am. Sankt-. L. J. 239 (1973).
22
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
23
 Bankruptcy is not a right which demands the lofty requirement of a compelling
governmental interest before [it] may be significantly regulated." United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434,, 446 (1973).
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ing the first 110 years of our nationhood; 24 it was not until 1898
that bankruptcy legislation became a permanent part of our
jurisprudence. 25
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898  provides relief to individuals and
businesses by allowing for: (1) voluntary bankruptcy, where a debtor
of his own accord may seek adjudication as a bankrupt; 26 (2) in-
voluntary bankruptcy, where creditors under certain conditions may
force a debtor into bankruptcy; 27 and (3) certain court-administered
plans. 28 After successfully meeting various administrative require-
ments, the bankrupt is entitled to a discharge, 29 releasing him from
most of his provable debts. 3 °
The purposes of the Act have been two-fold: (1) to secure all
non-exempt assets of the bankrupt and to distribute them propor-
tionately among his creditors; 31 and (2) to release the bankrupt from
liability for most prior obligations, giving him "a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt." 32 The legislative intent in
enacting the Bankruptcy Act was for the purpose of giving the
bankrupt a "fresh start" in life to be subordinate to that of establish-
24
 The bankruptcy acts together covered a period of 15 years. Their temporary nature
reflected legislative concern with the economic situation at the time. They were:
(1) Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed, Act of Dec. 19, 1803,
ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. The provisions of this act essentially worked against the interests
of the debtor.
(2) Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch, 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed, Act of March 3, 1843,.
ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. This act grew out of the commercial casualties of the panic of
1837. It followed English reforms, adopting the theory that a debtor might be honest
but unfortunate, and providing for his discharge.
(3) Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed, Act of June 7,
1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. This act was' enacted after the Civil War, and its
subsequent amendments were influenced by the panic of 1873.
See Johnson, Commentary on the Chandler Act or Revision of the Bankruptcy Act, in 11
U.S.C.A. (§§ 701 et seq.) 357, 357-58 (1970); 1 W. Collier, Bankruptcy III 0.04-.05 (14th ed.
1971); 1 H. Remington, Bankruptcy Law of the United States §§ 7-9 (5th ed. 1950).
25
 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255
(1970), resulted from the panic of 1893, and its major amendment, the Chandler Act, ch. 575,
52 Stat. 840 (1938), from the Great Depression. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 358; 1 W.
Collier, supra note 24, II 0.06; 1 H. Remington, supra note 24, § 10. The Bankruptcy Act has
been amended more than 90 times since its passage. D. Stanley & M. Girth, Bankruptcy:
Problem, Process, Reform 11 (1971). The constitutionality of the Act was upheld by a
unanimous Court in Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
26
 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970).
27
 11 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970).
213
 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-1086 (1970).
29
 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1970).
3°
 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
' I
 See, e.g., Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 320-21 (1931); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S.
605, 617 (1918); Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S, 549, 554 (1915).
32
 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Accord, Stellwagen, 245 U.S. at
617; Williams, 236 U.S. at 555; Hardie v. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 165 F. 588, 591
(5th Cir. 1908); United States v. Hammond, 104 F. 862, 863 (6th Cir. 1900).
An incidental effect is to promote a "financially self-sufficient" bankruptcy system. United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449 (1973).
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ing a procedure for collecting and distributing his non-exempt assets
among his creditors." Whereas early bankruptcy cases support this
interpretation, 34 both the language 35 and the outcome36 of more
recent cases indicate that the balance may be tipping in favor of
greater consideration of the bankrupt's interests.
The desire to achieve this dual purpose spurred the enactment
of legislation vesting the bankruptcy courts "with such jurisdiction
at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdic-
tion in [bankruptcy] proceedings . . . ."37 While the "at law" provi-
sion was presumably inserted to meet the requirement of section 2(4)
of the Act, 38 authorizing the trial and punishment of conduct in
violation of the Act, the courts of bankruptcy are "essentially courts
of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity." 39
The equitable powers must be administered consistently with the
Bankruptcy Act4 ° and according to the general principles and prac-
tices of equity.'" Nevertheless, some recent cases have stressed the
equitable and remedial aspects of the Act, disregarding its express
provisions in an attempt to reach a "fair" conclusion. 42
SECTION 70a(5)
1. Breadth of its Provisions
What property passes to the trustee in bankruptcy is governed
by section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. While the language of
33 See In re Leslie, 119 F. 406, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1903). Judge Ray, who wrote this
opinion, was a member of the House Judiciary Committee during passage of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, and served as chairman of that committee during passage of the 1903 amend-
ment. Note, 49 N.C.L. Rev. 738, 745 n,42 (1971).
34 See Straton, 283 U.S. at 320-21; Hardie, 165 F. at 590; Barton Bros. v. Texas
Produce Co., 136 F. 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1905); In re Dorgan's Estate, 237 F. 507, 509 (S.D.
Iowa 1916).
35 See Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244-45; Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103
(1966); Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 958 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting to
denial of cert.).
36 See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970), affg per curiam 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.
1970); In re Cedor, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.), affg per curiam 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973). Cf. Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968);
Bank of Marin v. England,' 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
37 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970).
38
 11 U.S.C. § 11(04) (1970). See Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 240; Bardes v. Hawarden
Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 535 (1900).
39 Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 240; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
48 See Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214 (1945); SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940); Nelson v. Svea Publishing Co., 178 F. 136, 140
(W.D. Wash. 1910).
Westall v. Avery, 171 F. 616, 628 (4th Cir. 1909). Equitable powers will be invoked so
"that fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done." Pepper, 308 U.S. at 305.
See also U.S. Realty, 310 U.S. at 455.
42 See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968); Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S.
99 (1966); Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966). See generally Aug., Recent
Trends in the Application of Equitable Principles of Bankruptcy, 43 Ref. J. 109 (1969).
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prior bankruptcy laws was of a very general nature, 43 transferring
to the trustee whatever would pass to the administrator of an estate
in the case of an intestacy," the current section 70a is a more
comprehensive statute, phrased in more specific language and
enumerating the kinds of property which pass to the trustee. 45 The
subsection relied on in Cedor and Kokoszka, section 70a(5), reads in
pertinent part:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall
. . be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initiat-
ing a proceeding under this title . . . to all of the following
kinds of property wherever located . . . (5) property, in-
cluding rights of action, which prior to the filing of the
petition he could by any means have transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial pro-
cess against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or se-
questered . . . . 46
This version of the section introduces the concept of transfera-
bility for the first time, in the words "which .. . he could by any
means have transferred." Controversy has arisen over the interpre-
tation of these words.'" It has been argued that only transfers
43 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch, 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 23, provided:
. . . [Clommissioners . . . shall have power to take into their possession, all the
estate, real and personal, of every nature and description to which the said bankrupt
may be entitled, either in law or equity, in any manner whatsoever .. . .
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 442, provided:
. . . That all the property, and rights of property, of every name and nature,.and
whether real, personal, or mixed, of every bankrupt . . . shall, by mere operation of
law, ipso facto, from the time of such decree [adjudication of bankruptcyl, be
deemed to be divested out of such bankrupt, ... and the same shall be vested . . . in
such assignee . . . .
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, § 14, 14 Stat. 522, provided:
... That as soon as said assignee is appointed and qualified, the judge ... shall . .
assign and convey to the assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt,
. . . and thereupon, by operation of law, the title to all such property and estate,
both real and personal, shall vest in said assignee . . .
44 The intestacy test was first employed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in Comegys v.
Vasse, 26 U.S. 193, 218 (1828); under the Act of 1867 in Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 543
(1891); and under the present Act in In re Evans, 253 F. 276, 277 (W,D. Tenn. 1918); cf. In re
Brown, 4 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1924).
43 The language of § 70a as originally enacted in 1898 was tightened up by subsequent
amendments. The Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 70a, 52 Stat. 873 (1938), introduced a number of
significant changes in § 70a, chief among them being that the date of filing a petition in
bankruptcy was to be the date of cleavage. The changes instituted within § 70a(5) itself were
the inclusion of the words "rights of action" and the proviso excepting purely personal actions
from the reach of the section. See 4A W. Collier, supra note 24, 5 70.03. The 1952
amendment, ch. 579, § 23, 66 Stat. 429 (1952), included the words "wherever located" in
§ 70a in order to clarify that the trustee has title to the bankrupt's property whether it is
located within the United States or outside its borders. See 4A W. Collier, supra at 31 n. lb.
46 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970).
47 Legislative history is unhelpful on the issue, as § 70 received only cursory attention,
See Recent Developments, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 380, 384 & n.18 (1962).
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voluntarily made by the bankrupt, and not those interests passing
by operation of law, were contemplated as passing to the trustee as
"transferred" property." Under the earlier acts, by virtue of an
adjudication in bankruptcy, property passed automatically by oper-
ation of the law of intestacy, to the trustee." The language of the
new act must have intended to change this rule; otherwise, the more
general language of the earlier acts would have been employed.
Moreover, if such an involuntary transfer by operation of law were
intended to be included under the language of transfer, there would
be no reason to include the alternate method of reaching the
bankrupt's property through levy or judicial sale. 5 °
However, it is submitted that a broad reading of section 70a(5),
encompassing both voluntary and involuntary transfers, is man-
dated. The word "transfer" is defined in the general definitional
section of the Bankruptcy Act to include "involuntary transfers.""
It has been construed in the common law to "[embrace] every
transaction which passes over or conveys property to another." 52
Moreover, the term "transfer" should be broadly construed in light
of the legislative intention to collect and distribute all the non-
exempt assets of the bankrupt's estate among his creditors. 53
2. Interests Which Pass to the Trustee	
•
In deciding whether a res passes to the trustee under section
70a(5), there must be an initial determination whether the
bankrupt's , interest in the res at the time of filing his petition in
bankruptcy was sufficient for it to constitute "property."54 "Post-
poned enjoyment" will not disqualify an interest as "property." 55
However, where the claim is contingent—not yet accrued and de-
4° See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 382 (1966). See also Recent Developments, supra
note 47, at 383-86.
49 See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
• " Segal, 382 U.S. at 382. Cf. Recent Developments, supra note 47, at 385.
51 11	 1(30) (1970) provides:
"Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct or
indirect, of disposing of or of parting with-property or with an interest therein or
with the possession thereof ... , absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involun-
tarily, by or without judicial proceedings . . . .
[Emphasis added.]
52 In re Barrow, 98 F. 582, 583 (W. D. Va. 1899). Accord, Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 182 U.S. 438, 444 (1901); Coder v. Arts, 152 F. 943, 949 (8th Cir. 1907), affd, 213 U.S.
223 (1909).
" Cf. Brown v. Crawford, 252 F. 248, 252 (ID. Ore. 1918). See note 31 supra and •
accompanying text.
54 Res which have been held to be,"pi-operty" within the meaning of § 70a(5) include:
disability payments—Legg v. St. John, 296 U.S. 489 (1936); a seat on the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange—Page v. Edmunds, 187 U.S. 596 (1903); pending applications for patents—In re
Cantelo Mfg. Co., 185 F. 276 (D. Me. 1911); and growing crops—In re Seiffert, 18 F.2d 444
(D. Mont. 1926); In re Barrow, 98 F. 582, (W.D. Va. 1899).
S5 Segal, 382 U.S. at 380; In re Leibowitt, 93 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
303 U.S. 652 (1938),
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pendent upon the happening of some future event—its determina-
tion as "property" is not so evident. Although "contingency in the
abstract is no bar,"56 some courts have required that the claim be
severable into portions attributable to events before and after bank-
ruptcy, and some difficulty has been encountered where the claim is
not readily divisible." In determining whether a claim is severable,
various factors are taken into account, including the intention of the
parties, the terms, nature and purpose of the subject matter, and the
surrounding circumstances." The burden has been placed on the
trustee to apply the "divisibility" test to the claim; if he cannot
apportion it, the entire amount remains in the bankrupt. 59 Some-
times the focus is on the quantum of the post-bankruptcy services to
be performed; an indivisible claim will not pass to the trustee where
substantial post-bankruptcy services are contemplated." However,
where the amount of the claim can be apportioned between pre- and
post-bankruptcy services, the fact that post-bankruptcy services to
be performed were substantial presumably will not preclude transfer
to the trustee of that portion of the claim which is attributable to
compensation for pre-bankruptcy services. 61
The remainder of the amount of the claim represents services to
be performed by the bankrupt after his adjudication in bankruptcy.
The bankrupt is released from his obligation to perform these ser-
vices; but if he chooses to perform under the contract, the bankrupt
rather than the trustee will receive the compensation. 62 To hold
otherwise would be to require the bankrupt to labor in a kind of
"involuntary servitude." 63
This conclusion is in accord with analogous cases which hold
that the assignment of future wages is merely an executory contract
which becomes executed and to which an equitable lien attaches
56 Segal, 382 U.S. at 380.
" See, e.g., Leibowitt, 93 F.2d at 335-36; Wooten v. Walters, 110 N.C. 251, 254-56, 14
S.E, 734, 735-36 (1892).
[Tihe criterion is to be found in the question whether the whole quantity—all of the
things as a whole--is of the essence of the contract. If it appear that the purpose was
to take the whole or none, then the contract would be entire; otherwise it would be
severable.
Id. at 256, 14 S.E. at 736, Once the contract itself is deemed severable, we reach the crucial
question of whether the compensation under the contract can be appropriately apportioned.
See Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435, 444-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 828 (1957).
56 Wooten, 110 N.C. at 254, 255, 14 S.E. at 735.
59 Hudson, 242 F.2d at 445, See, e.g., In re Thomas, 204 F.2d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 1953)
(court-appointed trustee at time of bankruptcy had performed only one of the four years of
service required); Leibowitt, 93 F.2d at 335-36 (substantial services needed to be rendered
after bankruptcy in order to earn commissions on insurance policies written before bank-
ruptcy).
" See, e.g., Leibowitt, 93 F.2d at 335.
61 See In re Edelman, 164 F. Supp. 728, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
62 In re Home Discount Co., 147 F. 538, 547-48 (NM. Ala. 1906).
63 Leibowitt, 93 F. 2d at 335. See also In re Wright, 157 F. 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1907); Home
Discount, 147 F. at 547-48.
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only when the wages are actually earned." A discharge in bank-
ruptcy, because it operates to release the bankrupt from the perfor-
mance of any future contractual obligations as of the date of the
adjudication, will cut off the assignee's equitable interest in future
wages before it can come into existence. 65 Similarly, future wages
will not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy upon adjudication—Ac-
crued, but unpaid wages, on the other hand, which the bankrupt
has clearly earned before adjudication in bankruptcy, will pass to
the trustee. 66
A NEW TEST
In two recent decisions, Segal v. Rochelle 67 and Lines v.
Frederick, 68
 the Supreme Court formulated and applied a new test
for determining whether a res is property which passes to the trustee
under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. 69 Although these cases
dealt with the question of whether business-generated loss carryback
tax refunds and accrued but unpaid vacation pay, respectively, fall
within the reach of section 70a(5), the Court's reasoning in determin-
ing whether such property passes to the trustee in bankruptcy is
used by analogy by the courts in Cedor and Kokoszka, and is
therefore basic to an understanding of these cases.
1. The Segal Test
The Supreme' Court in Segal was faced with the question
whether a refund resulting from the loss carryback provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code" was property within the meaning of sec-
tion 70a(5). The refund had resulted from partnership losses in the
taxable year which had been offset against income for the prior two
years, reducing the amount of tax owed for that period. 71
64 Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 50 F.2d 856, 857, 859 (4th Cir. 1931); In re
West, 128 F. 205, 206 (D. Ore. 1904).
65
 Home Discount, 147 F. at 548; West, 128 F. at 206.
66
 In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972, 974 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877
(1972). See also Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966); In re Cohen, 276 F. Supp. 889
(MD. Cal. 1967). See generally 4A W. Collier, supra note 24, Ill 70.34.
382 U.S. 375 (1966). This -case has been annotated in Seidman, Some Implications of
Segal v. Rochelle, 40 Ref. J. 107 (1966); Recent Decisions, 50 Marquette L. Rev. 143 (1966);
Recent Decisions, 39 Temp. L.Q. 368 (1966); Comment, 12 N.Y.L.F. 311 (1966); Note, 35
Fordham L. Rev. 342 (1966). The circuit court opinion, 336 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1964), is
annotated in Recent Decisions, 40 Notre Dame Law. 118 (1964); Note, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 122
(1965). The district court opinion, 221 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Tex. 1963), is annotated in Note,
42 Texas L. Rev. 542 (1964).
66 400 U.S. 18 (1970), affg per curiam 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1970). This case has been
annotated in Greenfield, Lines v. Frederick: The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Bankrupt's
Accrued Vacation Pay and Other Forms of Deferred Compensation, 47 Los Angeles B. Ass'n
Bull. 67 (1971); Lee, Title to Property—Employee Bankrupels] Vacation Pay, 45 Am. Bankr.
L:J. 115 (1971); Note, 49 N.C.L. Rev. 738 (1971).
69
 The pertinent portion of § 70a(5) is quoted in the text at note 46 supra.
70
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 172, 6411.
71 382 U.S. at 376.
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In two earlier decisions dealing with the same issue, 72 the First
and Third Circuits held that the taxpayer has no legal or equitable
interest in the claim for the refund at the time of the bankruptcy
filing; the right does not come into existence until the end of the
taxable year, when the amount of the losses can be determined. 73
Although both courts regretted the decision because of the possibility
of inequitable resultts, 74 they nonetheless held that the claim for the
refund was neither "property" nor a "right of action" within the
meaning of section 70a(5) and (6). 75
The Supreme Court in Segal, however, examined the nature of
section 70a(5) and decided that its "main thrust" was
to secure for creditors everything of value the bankrupt
may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his
petition. To this end the term "property" has been con-
strued most generously and an interest is not outside its
reach because it is novel or contingent or ,because enjoy-
ment must be postponed. 76
The Court also considered other purposes of the Act which it
deemed to limit the inclusive nature of section 70a(5). In particular,
the Court took into consideration the purpose of enabling the bank-
, rupt to be "free after the date of his petition to accumulate new
wealth in the future." 77
72 Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963); In re Sussman, 289 F.2d 76 (3d
Cir. 1961). Cf. In re Gignac, 222 F. Sapp. 557 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
73 318 F.2d at 527; 289 F.2d at 77-78. The court in Sussman held that even if the claim
were an existing property interest, it could not pass to the trustee because of the Assignment of
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970). 289 F.2d at 78. The inapplicability of the prohibitions of
this statute to the tax refund is discussed in the text at notes 116-19 infra.
74 318 F.2d at 527; 289 F.2d at 78. For example, if a bankrupt filed on Dec. 31, the
trustee would have no right of action for the tax refund; the bankrupt would retain it.
However, .if the bankrupt were to file on Jan. 1, the trustee would succeed to the refund.
Thus, a "windfall" may accrue to the bankrupt at the expense of the creditors on the basis of
one day's difference in filing. This seems particularly unjust since it is often the very business
losses which destroyed the capacity to pay the creditors that led to the tax refund. 289 F.2d at
78. In some cases, the amount of the refund is substantial and would be of great value to the
trustee in paying off the bankrupt's creditors. For example, in Fournier, the taxpayer was
entitled to a refund of $2800.52, and in Segal, $4236.32. 318 F.2d at 526; 336 F.2d at 299 n.2.
The courts in both Fournier and Sussman stated that they regretted the result, but that any
change would have to come from the legislature. 318 F.2d at 527; 289 'F.2d at 78.
Considerable commentary has been written on this subject. Most contend that the trustee
should succeed to the title of the refund, with some suggesting legislative change. See Herzog,
Bankruptcy Law—Modern Trends, 36 Ref. J. 18 (1962); Recent Decisions, 40 Notre Dame
Law. 118 (1964); Recent Developments, 14 Stan, L. Rev. 380 (1962); Recent Cases, 110 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 275 (1961); Note, 17 U. Fla. L. Rev, 241 (1964); Note, 40 Texas L. Rev. 569
(1962); Note, 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 345 (1961).
73 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5), (6) (1970). Section 70a(6) provides that "rights of action arising
upon contracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention of or injury to [the bankrupt's)
property" shall pass to the trustee. Since the Government usually does not dispute the
taxpayer's claim to a refund, this section is seldom used in this context.
76 382 U.S. at 379.
77 Id.
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The Court then formulated a new test, requiring consideration
not only of the comprehensive nature of section 70a(5), but also of
the equitable concern for providing the debtor with a new start
in life, in determining whether property or a right of action is
"sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little entan-
gled with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered fresh
start that it should be regarded as 'property' under § 70a(5)." 78 The
Court held that since a loss carryback refund was "sufficiently
rooted" in the pre-bankruptcy period and since denying it to the
bankrupt would not hinder his new opportunity in life, such a claim
was property within the meaning of section 70a(5) and would pass to
the trustee in bankruptcy. 79
2. Application of the Segal Test in Lines
As a result of Segal, courts will be required to consider both the
language of section 70a(5) itself and the question of whether a
transfer to the trustee of the bankrupt's property will impede his
new start in life. The application by the Supreme Court of this new
formulation in Lines v. Frederick" resulted in the holding that
accrued but unpaid vacation pay was not within the reach of section
70a(5), and thus narrowed the concept of "property" as it appears in
that section.
The Court in Lines, in holding that the vacation pay was not
"property," disregarded the facts that the pay was alienable or
transferrable according to the applicable state law" and that it was
based completely in pre-bankruptcy services. Instead, the Court
looked at the nature of the "property" and analogized it to future
wages. 82 It noted that wages are a specialized kind of property 83 and
that in this case they were the bankrupts' sole source of income."
In determining that the function of the accrued vacation pay
was "to support the basic requirements of life for [the bankrupts]
and their families during brief vacation periods or in the event of
layoff,"85
 the Court found that the transfer of the rights to the
vacation pay interfered with the bankrupts' opportunity to make a
"fresh start."86 Thus, vacation pay would be exempt from the sec-
tion 70a(5) provision."
7R
 Id. at 380.
79 Id.
88 400 U.S. 18 (1970), affg per curiam 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1970).
81
 Courts in bankruptcy are to follow state law in determining whether the bankrupt can
transfer his property, unless preempted by some federal law. See Board of Trade v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 1, 10 (1924); In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544, 546 (8th Cir,), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972); Danning v. Lederer, - 232 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1956).
" 400 U.S. at 20. See also In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 768 (3d Cir. 1947).
83 400 U.S. at 20, quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
e4 400 U.S. at 20.
83 Id.
Rh
 The Court did not distinguish between the situations of the two bankrupts in this case.
Frederick's employer closed down the plant for a week twice each year, forcing him to give up
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The decision in Lines will have a significant impact on deferred
compensation cases. A reexamination of all such "prop-
erty"—vacation pay, wages, and income tax refunds—will be re-
quired. Lines, in applying the Segal test, has in effect overturned the
long-established policy of leaving the determination of what prop-
erty is exempt from section 70a(5) to state law and federal
legislation. 88
 Here the Court, and not Congress, has undertaken the
formulation of a "national, uniform exemption policy." 89
THE Cedor AND Kokoszka DECISIONS
The courts in Cedor and Kokoszka examined the income tax
refund problem in light of Segal and Lines. A reading of the latter
two cases together requires that certain exceptions be carved out of
the otherwise comprehensive coverage of section 70a(5) where the
effect of including a res as "property" conflicts with other policy
considerations of the Act. 9° In deciding on which side of the line
income tax refunds lie, the Second and Ninth Circuits arrived at
opposite results.
1. Section 70a(5) "Property"
The Cedor court compared the income tax refund with the loss
carryback claim in Segal and with vacation pay in Lines. The tax
two weeks' wages; without his vacation pay he would have nothing in the way of compensa-
tion for these two weeks. Harris, on the other hand, had the more conventional voluntary
vacation plan; thus he had the option of forgoing his vacation and earning wages during that
period. See Kokoszka, 479 F.2d at 994; In re Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620, 624 n.12 (D. Minn.
1971), leave to appeal denied (8th Cir. May 14, 1971) (unreported), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1040 (1972).
The Court may have somewhat overstated the situation, since § 303 of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act (CCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1973), would apply to the vacation pay,
exempting from the trustee's reach up to 75% of the amount due the bankrupts. See Lee,
supra note 68, at 119. For a discussion of the application of the CCPA in another context, see
text at notes 126-43 infra.
87 This decision in effect overrules a lower court decision in the Ninth Circuit, In re
Kuether, 203 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1962). The court of appeals in Lines also disapproved
of In re Cohen, 276 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 1967), in which accrued but unpaid wages were
held to pass to the trustee. 425 F.2d at 216.
88 Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970), provides:
This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which
are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the state laws in force at the
time of the filing of the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for
the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer
portion of such six months than in any other State . . . .
Inconsistent treatment of the various kinds and amounts of exemptions has resulted from this
policy. See Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 Rutgers L. Rev.
678 (1960). However, the Supreme Court has held that the provision is a constitutional
exercise of the authority to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States," on the theory that the uniformity required is "geographical and not
personal." Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 185 U.S. 181, 188 (1902). See U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4.
H 9
 Lee, supra note 68, at 118. See also Note, N.C. L. Rev. 738, 746-47 (1971).
as See In re Jones, 337 F. Supp, 620, 624 (D. Minn. 1971), leaveto appeal denied (8th
Cir. May 14, 1971) (unreported), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972). 	 ,
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refund was found not to be "rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past" to
the extent that it was in Segal. There the tax refund represented
lbsses which had precipitated the bankruptcy; in Cedar it did not."
As in Lines, the claim for the refund represented an involuntary
withholding, accrued and unpaid, and which the bankrupt could
not reach prior to a specific time—upon leave for vacation or termi-
nation of employment in the case of vacation pay, or upon the filing
of a tax return in the case of the income tax refund. Although the
amount of vacation pay is easier to calculate, the undetermined
amount of a tax refund is an expected annual event. "To deprive the
wage-earner of that planned-on annually recurring payment, cannot
be said to be less severe than the deprivation of two weeks of paid
vacation, in terms of a fresh start." 92 In order to afford him that
"fresh start," the bankrupt was permitted to keep the refund. 93
The court in Kokoszka similarly analyzed the tax refund in
terms of the Segal and Lines decisions but came out with the
opposite result. It stated that Lines had carved out "a very narrow
exception to the general proposition that everything of value passes
to the trustee."94 The exception ought to be limited, then, to situa-
tions "where the minimal requirements for the economical survival
of the debtor are at stake." 95 The vacation pay in that instance was
necessary for "economic survival" during time off or in the event of
termination; the bankrupt's opportunity for a fresh start would be
hampered without this assistance. An income tax refund, on the
other hand, is not the periodic income required by a wage-earner for
his basic support, and depriving him of it would not interfere with
his opportunity as a bankrupt to accumulate new wealth.
It is submitted that the approach taken by the Kokoszka court is
the more appropriate one. Conceptually there is a significant differ-
ence between vacation pay and an income tax refund. In applying
the Segal test, both find their source in pre-bankruptcy wages. The
difference in their nature, however, is apparent when they, are
analyzed to determine whether their deprivation impedes a
bankrupt's new start in life. The desperate situation in which one is
dependent upon periodic payments•of wages for his basic support
and must forgo them for a certain period of time is' distinguishable
91 337 F. Supp. at 1105. However, although on the particular facts in Cedor it could not
be said that the losses resulting in the refund were the cause of the bankruptcy, there are
situations in which the refund could be. For example, an uninsured casualty loss, large
expenditures for medical bills, or an extended period of layoff from employment are all factors
which could not only drive a debtor into bankruptcy but could also result in a sizeable refund
check. See Lee, Title to Property—Employee Bankrupts' Income Tax Refunds, 47 Am.
Bankr. L,J. 239, 241-42 (1973). The larger the amount of the refund, the more likely that its
origin is found in the pre-bankruptcy past. Id, at 241.
92
.337 F. Supp. at 1105.
91 Actually, the bankrupt could keep only that portion resulting from withholding in
excess of the minimum amount required by law, See text at notes 106-115 infra.
94 479 F.2d at 994.
95 400 U.S. at 20.
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from the situation in which a debtor receives his wages and, in
addition, his income tax refund. It is not the function of a refund to
support the basic requirements of life; the bankrupt does not forgo
future wages after bankruptcy because he has lost his tax refund
based on pre-bankruptcy wages. In this context, accrued but unpaid
vacation pay is more analogous to future wages, forming the basis
for support sometime after bankruptcy. The income tax refund, on
the other hand, is more in the nature of a bonus."
Furthermore, in the case of vacation pay, the employee finds no
similarity between earned wages which he will receive at the end of
the week and the bookkeeping entries of accrued vacation pay
credited to him. 97 In real economic terms, vacation pay is "earned"
during the period of vacation after bankruptcy. But an income tax
refund represents wages earned in the pre-bankruptcy past in both
bookkeeping and economic terms." 1
Once the vacation pay is accrued, there is no post-bankruptcy
event which can vary the amount. In the case of an income tax
refund, however, the amount accruing to the taxpayer at the time of
his adjudication as a bankrupt is not firmly established, but is rather
dependent upon post-bankruptcy events happening before the end of
the taxable year. Moreover, in the case of an income tax refund, a
portion of the taxpayer's wages are withheld under federal law for
eventual tax liability. These funds never reach the taxpayer's hands;
they become government property at the same time that the tax-
payer receives his take-home pay. The wages are not withheld under
any program whereby they or any portion thereof will be returned to
the wage-earner at some future time to insure his support when he is
without his daily earnings, as is the case with vacation pay.
The court in Kokoszka found unpersuasive the argument that
since a tax refund is an annual "planned-on" event, the bankrupt
ought to retain it. 99 Payment on Christmas Club accounts and year-
end stock dividends are other annual occurrences, but that does not
preclude them from the reach of section 70a(5). The purpose of the
Act is to place the bankrupt on the same footing as others similarly
situated on the date of bankruptcy;'°° but a refund would give the
bankrupt a "head start," not just a "fresh start" in life."'
The Cedor court found the tax refunds "quite similar in a
practical sense" to wages. 102 The court referred to Sniadach v.
96 See Lee, supra note 91, at 241.
99 Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d at 217.
°El Closing Brief of Appellants at 203, In re Cedor, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972).
99 See Kokoszka, 479 F.24 at 995.
'°° In re Aveni, 458 F.2d 972, 973 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 877 (1972).
1 °' 479 F.2d at 995. Cf. Lines, 400 U.S. at 21 (dissenting opinion). Similarly, in the case
of vacation pay, it could be argued that the bankrupt should receive the same benefits as if he
had been hired as a new employee on the date of bankruptcy. There is no reason why
pre-bankruptcy employment should determine the length of any post-bankruptcy vacation.
Greenfield, supra note 68, at 70.
sox 337 F. Supp. at 1105.
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Family Finance Corp.
'
 1°3 in which the Supreme Court recognized
wages as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system."'" As Kokoszka indicates, however, the
reference to wages is in the context of periodic payments that sup-
port the basic necessities in life. 105 The "special protection" required
for wages is reserved for the periodic payments of wages, not for
property whose source happens to be wages. Otherwise, any prop-
erty which originated in wages—be it an automobile, a share in a
corporation, or a savings account—would be equally entitled to
treatment as "wages."
Cedor distinguishes the bankrupt who has an income tax refund
resulting from withholding the minimum amount required by law
from the one who elects to withhold more than the minimum
amount required. In the case of the latter, Cedar concedes that the
portion reflecting the amount withheld in excess of the minimum is
"property" within the meaning of section 70a(5). 1 °6 The court based
its distinction primarily on the voluntary element involved. In
Lines, the employee could not control the amount accrued—he could
neither subtract from nor add to the fund—as one in effect can do in
the case of a tax refund. The size of the refund can be increased by
claiming fewer exemptions than one is actually entitled to,'" as did
the bankrupt James in Cedar, 108 or by declaring a larger estimated
income than is actually received.'" This degree of control in the
case of a tax refund would create an opportunity for the potential
bankrupt to defraud his creditors if the additional amount of the
refund were not deemed "property.""°
However, Cedor points out the injustice in establishing a sys-
tem which, .on the one hand, allows a taxpayer to elect the number
of exemptions he may take in order to insure that his tax liability is
met, and then, on the other hand, penalizes him with the loss of his
refund in the case of bankruptcy.'" If it is in the "national interest"
to assure that the taxpayers withhold a sufficient amount so that
taxes are promptly paid, a transfer to the trustee of the excess
withholding would seem to "frustrate the objective of the withhold-
ing laws." 112 The new Form W-4, however, has been designed in
conformity with section 3402(m) of the Internal Revenue Code' 13 to
' 03 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
104 Id. at 340. The importance of wages in our society, which the Sniadach Court
stressed, has been established in a series of cases dealing with the constitutionality of
prejudgment garnishment. E.g., McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 666 (1970); Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969). ,
105-
 479 F.2d at 995.
i" 337 F. Supp. at 1106.
1°7 See, e.g., In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
108 Opening Brief of Appellants at 2, In re Cedor, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972).
109 See, e.g., Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1925).
110 337 F. Supp. at 1106.
"' Id. at 1107.
112 Id.
113 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3404(m).
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prevent the overpayment of income taxes. According to one com-
mentator, a taxpayer who fails to exercise his options under this
provision has "voluntarily" overpaid his taxes." 4 In that case, his
refund can be likened to any other use to which the bankrupt
voluntarily puts his wages, such as a loan to another or an invest-
ment in securities—property which undeniably passes to the trustee.
Kokoszka glosses over the voluntary element involved in this
analysis, and, it is submitted, rightfully so. Clearly one who invests
his money in securities, a savings account or an automobile volun-
tarily elects to do so. The taxpayer who claims the requisite number
of exemptions has no choice: his wages are, in fact, involuntarily
withheld to meet his eventual tax liability. However, retention of
these wages by the employer in effect creates a savings account for
the employee out of which he will pay his taxes for the year. When
the taxpayer authorizes withholding in excess of the minimum re-
quired by law, he is simply adding to this savings account. There is
no reason to treat this "forced savings account" differently from any
other savings account which would pass to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. The element of voluntariness may be reflected in the size of
the- refund, but it should not be the decisive factor in determining
whether the refund is "property" within section 70a(5).
It is submitted that the contortions required by the Cedor court
are unnecessary in determining whether and to what extent a
refund—or a portion thereof—is attributable to withholding in ex-
cess of the minimum. The fact that a taxpayer might defraud his
creditors by misusing the exemption system is not a convincing
reason to deny all taxpayers their refunds." 5
 The similarities be-
tween vacation pay and income tax refunds should not be extended
beyond the involuntary aspect and the common, source in pre-
bankruptcy wages. While the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act man-
date that the bankrupt retain the vacation pay, no such urgency
exists in the case of the tax refund. In analyzing the Segal test and
its application in the Lines case, and its consequent treatment of the
refund as "property," regardless of whether it results from voluntary
or involuntary withholding, the Kokoszka court's analysis seems the
correct one.
2. Transferability
After finding that a refund due to optional withholding was
"property," the Cedor court considered whether it was capable of
transfer to the trustee and held that it was. 116 Although transferabil-
1i4 Lee, supra note 91, at 243.
315
 If there is a possibility that the exemption system could be misused in this fashion, a
rebuttable presumption could be created that no fraud was intended. The burden would then
be on the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to establish the fraud. The burden of proof is
placed on the Commissioner in other situations, e.g., to establish fraud with intent to evade
payment of taxes, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7454(a); and to establish the illegality of a
payment or bribe, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 4 162(c)(1).
316
 337 F. Supp. at 1106.
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ity in general is determined by state law,'" it is preempted by
federal law where an assignment of a claim against the government
is involved. The Assignment of Claims Act's provides that "[a]l'
transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States
.. shall be absolutely null and void" unless certain requirements
not here relevant are met. However, the Claims Act will not prevent
the assignment of a claim against the Government as between the
parties since the purpose of the statute was simply to give protection
to the Government. 19
 Thus, the Claims Act will not stand in the
way of the transfer of title to an income tax refund to a trustee in
bankruptcy.
3. Abandonment
Kokoszka also dealt with the argument that the refund would
be of no benefit to the creditors since it would be consumed by the
expenses of administration.' 20
 The Bankruptcy Act sets a maximum
scale for compensation allowed the trustee, permitting up to $150
plus expenses no matter how small the estate. 121 While the practice
varies across the country, generally the trustee is awarded the max-
imum fee. 122
 Where the amount of non-exempt assets is small, it
may be cancelled out by the costs of administration.' 23
However, as a general rule, the fact that a refund may be small
ought not to bar its inclusion within section 70a(5), 124 as it may be
only one asset among others. Where the amount of the non-exempt
assets of the bankrupt's estate in its entirety is insufficient to benefit
1 " See notes 81 and 88 supra and accompanying text.
118
 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
114 See Segal, 382 U.S. at 384; Martin v. National Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588, 596 (1937).
138
 479 F.2d at 995. Los Angeles has resolved this problem by adopting the practice that
its trustees are not perMitted to claim a tax refund unless it exceeds $150. See In re
Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498, 505 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 470 F.2d 996
(9th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1973) (No. 73-289).
It has been suggested that the doctrine of "de minimis" might have been the real
motivation and should have been the legal ljustification for the outcome in Lines. Greenfield,
Lines v. Frederick: The Effect of Bankruptcy on a Bankrupt's Accrued Vacation Pay and
Other Forms of Deferred .
 Compensation, 47 Los Angeles B. Ass'n Bull. 67, 67 n.3 (1971).
' 2 ' 11 U.S.C. § 76(c)(1) (1970). The stated purpose of the provision is to secure competent
trustees and efficient administration by providing more adequate compensation. Snedecor,
Fees and Allowances in Straight Bankruptcy, 40 Ref. J. 26, 27 (1966). See generally In re
Schautz, 390 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1968); 2 W. Collier, Bankruptcy Q 48.06 (14th ed. 1971); D.
Stanley & M. Girth, Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Refortif 91-92, 175-88 (1971).
122 See Snededor, supra note 121, at 26. 27.
123
 Most of the debtor's non-exempt, unencumbered property is either valueless or has
been attached or repossessed prior to bankruptcy. Cyr, Single Claim Jurisdiction for the
United States Court of Consumer Affairs: An Interim Proposal for Relevant Regulation of
Consumer Credit, 46 Am. Bankr. L.J. 199, 226 (1972). Of the bankruptcies filed in 1969, 15%
had assets, 15% had only nominal assets (assets sufficient only to pay the administrative
expenses), and 70% had no assets. Lee, [Book Review, 46 Am. Bankr. L.J. 159, 161 (1972).]
See D. Stanley & M. Girth, supra note 121, at 20.
124
 See In re Wright, 157 F. 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1907); In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837,
842 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
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his creditors, the court in its discretion may grant an order of
abandonment.' 25
 Abandonment is concerned, however, with the
size of the non-exempt asset and not with whether the asset should
be considered "property" within section 70a(5).
4. Restriction on Garnishment
The Cedor and Kokoszka courts also disagreed as to the appli-
cation of the Restriction on Garnishment provision, section 303 of
the Consumer Credit. Protection Act (CCPA). 126
 This provision pro-
vides that no more than twenty-five percent of one's "disposable
earnings" may be subjected to garnishment. The bankrupts in Cedor
had contended that section 303 would exempt up to seventy-five
percent of the refund if it, or some portion thereof, were found to be
"property. " 127
 Although the court in Cedor admitted that the theory
was "somewhat strained at first glance," 128
 it arrived at the conclu-
sion that the Restriction on Garnishment provision was applicable
by an analysis of the definitions in section 302 of the CCPA, which
provides:
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or
payable for personal services, whether denominated as •
wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and in-
cludes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retire-
ment program.
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of
the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduc-
tion from those earnings of any amounts required by law to
be withheld.
(c) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equit-
able procedure through which the earnings of any indi-
vidual are required to be withheld for payment of any
debt. 129
The source of the refund was "earnings" as within the meaning of
section 302(a). The court found no policy reason "why the amount of
the refund should be held to have lost its character as 'earnings' by
reason of its somewhat circuitous route to the wage-earner's
hands." 3° Since nothing was required to be withheld from the
refund, it was "disposable earnings" as defined in section 302(b).
The process by which the trustee took title to the refund was a "legal
125
 Courts have established their own standards for the abandonment of an asset. An
asset may be abandoned, e.g., if it (1) is inherently worthless; (2) is too expensive to maintain;
(3) has a speculative value; (4) involves too much time in collecting; or (5) cannot be sold or
liquidated. Calverley, Income Tax Refunds Due Wage Earners, 39 Ref. J. 8, 10 (1965).
129 15	 1673 (1970).
122
 337 F. Supp. at 1104.
129
 Id. at 1107.
129 15 U.S.C.	 1672 (1970).
13° 337 F. Supp. at 1107.
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or equitable procedure" whereby the earnings of an individual were
withheld for payment of a debt, a procedure falling within the
definition of "garnishment" in section 302(c). 13 '
The court in Kokoszka explicitly rejected the Cedar court's
reasoning on this .point," 2 holding that the tax refund was not
"earnings" within the meaning of section 302 and was therefore not
protected by section 303.' 33 The court also looked to one of the
primary purposes of the CCPA—to protect the wage-earner from the
garnishment of all his take-home pay—in arriving at this
conclusion.' 34
The kind of garnishment to which the CCPA refers is defined in
Black's Law Dictionary as
[a] statutory proceeding whereby [a] person's property,
money or credits in possession or under control of, or
owing by, another are applied to [the] payment of [the]
former's debt to [the] third person by proper statutory
process against [the] debtor and [the] garnishee.' 35
This traditional form of wage garnishment would seem to preclude
the bankruptcy procedure whereby the trustee would receive the
refund check; it is difficult to see how the referee's turn-over order
can be construed as a garnishment where the title to the refund
passes to the trustee by operation of law. The bankrupt has already
received the object of "garnishment," i.e., the tax refund check. He
may voluntarily turn it over to the trustee or he may disobey the
order and spend it.
Moreover, a semantic analysis of the Restriction on Garnish-
ment provision reveals that the section is regulatory, limiting the
amount of the wages which may be garnished; it does not exempt or
immunize the wages from garnishment. The Bankruptcy Act, how-
ever, permits only those exemptions allowed by state and federal
law. 136 It is submitted, then, that the provision of the CCPA does
not apply to an income tax refund.
There is nothing in the legislative history of the CCPA to
indicate that the legislature intended the restrictions of section 303 to
extend beyond the protection of wage-earners from the creditors'
remedy of garnishment. In a 1967 message on consumer protection,
President Johnson stated that he was directing "a comprehensive
study of the problems of wage garnishment [with recommendations
as to] the steps to be taken to protect the hard-earned wages and the
jobs of those who need the income most."' 37 The resulting act has as
131 Id.
' 32 479 F.2d at 996.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 996-97.
' 35
 Black's Law Dictionary 810 (4th ed. 1968).
136 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). • The text of this section is quoted in note 88 supra.
137 Message from President Johnson, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967),
reprinted in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1966 (1968).
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its preamble: "An Act Rio safeguard the consumer in connection
with the utilization of credit .. . by restricting the garnishment of
wages . . ." 138
 The purposes of the Act are set forth in House
Report No. 1040, and include relief to debtors "to preserve their
employment and insure a continued means of support for themselves
and their families" so as to prevent them from being driven into
bankruptcy." 9
 Since the CCPA is federal legislation, the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) has been formulated, embodying
most aspects of the CCPA, for state adoption. The comments to the
particular sections in the UCCC are used here to show how the
UCCC provisions have been interpreted, and thus, by analogy, how
the similar CCPA provisions are construed. The comments to sec-
tions 5.104-.105 of the UCCC, which are based on sections 302-03 of
the CCPA, reiterate that the objective is to "assure the consumer
debtor that he will retain enough of his earnings to be able to
support himself and his dependents by exempting a portion of his
earnings from garnishment . . . 1)140
The legislative intent behind the CCPA, then, would seem to be
the protection of a debtor's periodic take-home pay, not his annual
income tax refund nor any other property which merely had its
source in that pay. The language of section 303(a) itself refers to an
individual's disposable earnings "for any workweek," limiting gar-
nishment to a percentage of his disposable earnings "for that week."
If a refund because it found its source in earnings retains its charac-
ter as "earnings" despite the "somewhat circuitous route" back to the
wage-earner, a stock dividend or interest from a savings account
could be analyzed in a similar fashion. And yet, those latter two
assets obviously would not be considered "earnings" paid as "com-
pensation . .. for personal services;" 141
 nor would the garnishment
process be applied to an automobile or furniture because those items
found their source in earnings.
Taxes withheld from a wage-earner and subject to a potential
claim for a refund cannot be called "disposable earnings" within the
I" Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (emphasis added).
' 34 H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 2 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 1962, at 1979 (1968). Testimony and evidence received by the House Banking and
Currency Committee established a causal connection between harsh garnishment laws and
high levels of bankruptcies. Id. at 1978, For example, while Texas and Pennsylvania, which
prohibit garnishment of wages, have 5 and 9 consumer bankruptcies per 100,000 population,
respectively, states with relatively harsh garnishment laws have had as many as 200 to 300.
Id.
For an indication of the variation in state garnishment provisions before the passage of
the CCPA, see D. Stanley & M. Girth, supra note 121, at 28-29; Brunn, Wage Garnishment
in California: A Study and Recommendations, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 1214, 1250-53 (1965). See.
generally Shuchman & Jantscher, Effects of the Federal Minimum Exemption from Wage
Garnishment on Non-business Bankruptcy Rates, 77 Corn. L.J. 360 (1972); Wage Garnish-
ment in Washington—An Empirical Study, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 743 (1968); Note, 1967 Wis. L.
Rev. 759.
140 Uniform Consumer Credit Code §§ 5.104-.105, comment 3.
' 4 ' 15 U.S.C,
	 1672(a) (1970).
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meaning of section 302(b). The UCCC comments to that section
specifically provide that "amounts required to be withheld for .. .
income taxes . . . are excluded from 'disposable earnings.' " 142 That
fund cannot logically resume its character as wages when returned
to the bankrupt. "Disposable earnings" is that portion of the earn-
ings remaining after any deductions required by law are withheld; ,
the tax refund represents a portion of those deductions, and is thus
the inverse of disposable earnings. 143
Since a tax refund does not constitute "disposable earnings"
under section 302(b) of the CCPA, it may pass to the trustee in
bankruptcy without the restriction required by section 303. Thus,
once again, it is submitted that the Kokoszka court reached a more
suitable conclusion than the court in Cedor in deciding that the
CCPA was inapplicable to income tax refunds.
CONCLUSION
Cedor has been criticized as "an unrestricted, open-ended ex-
pansion of the Lines doctrine."'" At the time Lines was decided,
section 70a(5) had traditionally been construed to encompass a wide
range of property interests and to limit those which would remain in
the possession of the bankrupt. It is submitted that the Supreme
Court in Lines intended to carve out only a narrow exception to this
general rule, and that Cedor extended the Lines holding to an
untenable degree. The Kokoszka court's analysis was more accurate,
and continues the well-established line of cases holding that a tax
refund does constitute section 70a(5) property." 5 In addition, the
court in Kokoszka accepted the necessity of considering the purposes
of the Bankruptcy Act in analyzing the nature of the bankrupt's
property. It weighed both the interests of the creditors and those of
the bankrupt, and determined that the latter's ability to start anew
would not be hampered by the passage to the trustee of his claim to
an income tax refund. The Bankruptcy Act intended only to place
the bankrupt on an equal footing with others from the time of his
discharge in bankruptcy; a refund check received by the bankrupt
subsequent to his discharge would in fact give him a "head start"
over the others.
The situation created by Kokoszka and Cedor is one of uncer-
tainty. A more analytical, and perhaps more subjective, determina-
tion of what constitutes "property" is required. In fact, all "prop-
erty" has to be reexamined in light of these decisions. Courts will
look beyond the mechanical test of section 70a(5) to the purposes
behind the Bankruptcy Act. However, although these additional
142
 Uniform Consumer Credit Code §§ 5.104-.105, comment 3.
141
 For further analysis of the language of § 1673, see generally Lee, Title to Property
—Employee Bankrupts' Income Tax Refunds, 47 Am. Bankr. L.j. 239 (1973).
144 Id. at 241.
145 See note 1 supra.
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factors may bring a more realistic approach to the question of what
constitutes "property," the injection of subjectivity has led to incon-
sistency in treatment by various courts, as exemplified by the
conflicting decisions in Cedar and Kokoszka. The Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari' 46 provides the opportunity to resolve the
conflicting positions. It will hear argument on two questions: (1)
does a bankrupt wage-earner's federal income tax refund constitute
"property" within the meaning of section 70a(5) and thus pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy or is the refund excluded from its reach under
the " 'fresh start' doctrine" as enunciated in Cedar; and (2) if the
total amount of the refund—or some portion thereof—is "property"
which vests in the trustee, will the Restriction on Garnishment
provision of the CCPA apply to exempt up to seventy-five percent of
the amount?' 47
If the Supreme Court rules that a bankrupt wage-earner's in-
come tax refund does not constitute "property" within the meaning
of section 70a(5), it is submitted that Congress should pass legisla-
tion which would effectively abrogate the Court's position. The
Internal Revenue Code could be amended so that an adjudication in
bankruptcy would terminate the tax year, as is done with the death
of a taxpayer. 148 In this way, the right to the refund would vest in
the trustee from the date of bankruptcy rather than retroactively. 149
However, there would be administrative difficulties: the bankrupt
would have to file two tax returns and possibly two claims for
refunds, requiring wasteful duplication both on his part and on the
part of the Government in processing them.' 5 ° Coordinated con-
struction of two separate statutes—the Bankrruptcy Act and the
Internal Revenue Code—would also be required.'" Even with such
an amendment, there would still have to be a determination whether
the claim was transferable prior to bankruptcy according to section
70a(5). 152 In order to avoid these difficulties, it would appear to be
more effective to amend the Bankruptcy Act itself to provide that an
income tax refund passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. 153
Section 70a has been amended in the past in order to avoid
problems of construction inherent in its language. 154 It is submitted
14° 42 U.S.L.W. 3.352 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973) (No. 73-5265) .
142 42 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Dec. 25, 1973) (No. 73-5265),
14° Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 443(a)(2). See Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525, 527
n.3 (1st Cir. 1963); Seidman, Some Implications of Segal v. Rochelle, 40 Ref. J. 107, 108
(1966); Recent Cases, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 275, 280 (1961); Note, 17 U. Fla. L. Rev. 241, 253
n.62 (1964).
149 Cf. Recent Cases, supra note 148, at 280.
15° Id. at 280 n.31.
15 ' Id, at 280.
152 Note, 17 U. Fla. L. Rev, 241, 253 m62 (1964).
153 See id.
154 The Chandler Act amendment of § 70a was enacted in order to prevent the passage of
certain contingent interests to the bankrupt, as in, e.g., Dioguardi v. Curran, 35 F.2d 431 (4th
Cir. 1929); In re Baker, 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S, 733 (1926). See
Fournier, 318 F.2d at 527 n.3.
575
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
that this section ought once again to be amended to avoid any
confusion as to the nature of income tax refunds. A proposed
amendment to be added to section 70a is:
The trustee shall be vested with title to such income tax
refund claims as may be vested in the bankrupt at the time
of the filing of his petition in bankruptcy, or as may vest in
the bankrupt subsequent-to the filing of the petition insofar
as they are attributable to pre-bankruptcy income, regard-
less of whether such refunds are attributable to the
minimum withholding required by law or withholding in
excess of that minimum)"
The "insofar as" clause would enact into law the practice of some
courts of dividing the refund into portions attributable to pre- and
post-bankruptcy periods.' 56 Such prorating results in more equitable
treatment for the 'taxpayer, particularly where large amounts are
withheld. The courts should be able to work out mathematical
formulae for appoitioning the refund. Where the bankrupt continues
to have a steady source of income for the entire taxable year, this
will be relatively simple. Where the bankrupt realizes proportion-
ately less income in the post-bankruptcy period, however, thereby
generating a larger tax refund, the formula will have to be some-
what more complex. The "regardless of" clause is intended to re-
solve the contrary holdings of Cedor and Kokoszka with regard to
minimum withholding in favor of the Kokoszka court's analysis.
If directly amending section 70a is not feasible, perhaps an
indirect approach could be attempted. A national •exemption law
might more realistically—and, at least, more consistently—deal with
the bankrupt. 157 Currently, many of the state exemption laws are
outdated. Although the CCPA has initiated much-needed reform, a
more liberal policy.would place the bankrupt in a position where he
would be better able to start out anew, without the necessity of
awarding him his refund check.
Finally, major reform may be called for by means of a thorough
155
 For similar propo'sed amendments to cover the loss carryback situation, see Note, 17
U. Fla. L. Rev. 241, 253-54 (1964); Note, 16 U. Miami L. Rev. 345, 348 n.26 (1961).
1 " For cases in which prorating has been used, see In re Cedor, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir.),
afrg per curiam 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 973 (1973); In re
Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds and remanded per curiam,
470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1973)
(No. 73-289). In re Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620 (D. Minn. 1971), leave to appeal denied (8th Cir.
May 14, 1971) (unreported), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972); In re Cohen, 276 F. Supp. 889
(N.D. Cal. 1967); In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962). Cf. Segal v. Rochelle,
382 U.S. 375, 380 n.5 (1966).
157
 A national exemption policy has been urged by various commentators. See, e.g.,
Seligson, Major Problems for Consideration by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States, 45 Am. Bankr. L. J. 73, 107-08 (1971); S. Enzer, R. de Brigard & F. Lazar,
Some Considerations Concerning Bankruptcy Reform 11, 55 (Report R-28, Institute for the
Future, Menlo Park, Calif., March 1973) [hereinafter cited as S. Enzer].
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revamping of the bankruptcy system itself.' 58 The Ninety-First
Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States' 59 to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend
changes to [the present Bankruptcy Act], in order for such Act to
reflect and adequately meet the demands of present technical,
financial, and commercial activities."'" The study will consider:
the basic philosophy of bankruptcy, the causes of bank-
ruptcy, the possible alternatives to the present system of
bankruptcy administration, the applicability of advanced
management techniques to achieve economies in the ad-
ministration of the Act, and all other matters which the
Commission shall deem relevant.'
The Commission is thus given considerable latitude in making rec-
ommendations for specific changes in the Act or for alternative
methods of bankruptcy administration.
The time is ripe for a change in dealing with the question
whether an income tax refund should stay in the hands of the debtor
or should be used in the payment of his debts. The major impetus
for change comes from the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari.
Reform may also result from recommendations of the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws, or from Congress, by amendment either
of the Internal Revenue Code or of the Bankruptcy Act or by
overhauling the entire Act.
KATHERINE L. BABSON, JR.
158 As the system exists now, the bankrupt's discharge is inadequate as to all parties
involved. The bankrupt, although freed from most of his past debts, is left with minimal
assets and no immediate prospect of rehabilitation. See generally S. Enzer, supra note 157, at
8-10; Cyr, Bankruptcy Courts in Transition Toward Debtor Rehabilitation, 22 Me, L. Rev.
333 (1970). As for the bankrupt's creditors, there are rarely enough assets to cover the
bankrupt's outstanding debts, so that creditors must settle for less than the full amount of the
debt owed. The average creditor realizes only about sixteen cents on the dollar. D. Stanley &
M. Girth, supra note 121, at 21. See also id. at 92-93; Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom,
77 Harv. L, Rev. 1452, 1454 (1964). Annual credit losses from business and non-business
bankruptcies are in excess of one billion dollars. Seligson, supra note 157, at 85. See generally
D. Stanley & M. Girth, supra at 37-39.
159 Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 1(a), 84 Stat. 468 (1970). A two-year period for completion and
up to $600,000 was authorized for the study. Pub. L. No. 91-354, §§ 1(c), 6, 84 Stat, 468, 469
(1970). The Commission's report was not available at the. time of this writing.
140 Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 1(b), 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
161 Id.
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